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COMMENTS
STATUTORY RAPE - DEFENSES - A BONA FIDE AND REASON-
ABLE MISTAKE AS TO THE PROSECUTRIX's AGE IS A DEFENSE TO
STATUTORY RAPE.
A significant development in criminal law has recently taken
place in California. A seventeen year and nine month old girl vol-
untarily had intercourse with one Hernandez, who was under a
bona fide and reasonable belief that she was over the age of con-
sent.' Hernandez was convicted of statutory rape. He appealed, as-
signing as error the trial court's refusal to allow evidence of his be-
lief as to the girl's age. The Supreme Court of California reversed,
reasoning that a crime, even the crime of rape, requires a union of
act and intent, and that if the defendant reasonably believes the
female to be over the age of consent, the requisite intent is lacking.
People v. Hernandez, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964).
It has long been settled that if the female was actually under
the age of consent at the time of the act of intercourse, the defend-
ant was guilty whether or not he knew her true age.2 The law de-
termined her capacity to give operative consent and the defendant's
belief as to the facts, however reasonable, was irrelevant.3 Hernan-
dez appears to be the first statutory rape case in the United States
to allow the introduction of evidence for the purpose of showing as
a defense that the defendant had a bona fide belief that the female
was over the age of consent.4 In doing so the court expressly over-
ruled sixty-eight years of California precedent.5 Other states have
1 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261-1. Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished
with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, under . . . the following
circumstances:
1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years ....
2 Efsiever v. People, 105 Colo. 88, 96 P.2d 8 (1939), wherein the evidence
that prosecutrix told defendant she was twenty years old was uncontradicted.
3 People v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711 (1897); Manship v. People, 99
Colo. 1, 58 P.2d 1215 (1936); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N.E. 310
(1910); State v. Sherman, 106 Iowa 684, 77 N.W. 461 (1898); Common-
wealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 N.E. 504 (1896); Smith v. State, 44
Tex. Crim. 137, 68 S.W. 995 (1902).
4 A number of states have by statute, however, made such belief a defense.
See, e.g., 38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 11-4(b) : "It shall be an affirmative
defense to indecent liberties with a child that: (1) the accused reasonably
believed the child was of the age of 16 or upwards at the time of the act
giving rise to the charge .... " N.M. STAT. § 40-A-9-3 (1953) : " . . . A
reasonable belief on the part of the male at the time of the alleged crime
that the female was sixteen [161 years of age or older is a defense to crim-
inal liability for statutory rape."
5 The rule was established at least as early as People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132,
46 Pac. 915 (1896). An examination of the California cases which have
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allowed presentation of such evidence, but as a consideration in
passing sentence rather than as a defense.0
The traditional argument supporting such absolute liability,
premised on protection of the "innocent child," has been stated by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky:
The victim is without capacity and discretion to have
a proper conception of the character of the offense being
committed against her person, or to comprehend its con-
sequences fully, or perhaps to possess the strength of will to
resist the influence and importunities of the ravisher. That
is actually so of an idiot and presumptively so of a child.
7
The validity of this argument is questionable.'
Counsel for Hernandez did not attempt to prove that the prose-
cutrix had the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse.9 Instead,
they argued that unless intent is expressly or by necessary implica-
tion excluded by statute,"' a crime requires a joint operation of act
cited Ratz revealed no statutory rape cases. Apparently the question of
admission of evidence showing defendant's belief as to the prosecutrix's
age was not argued in the Supreme Court of California from the time of
the Ratz decision until the advent of Hernandez.
6 See, e.g., Law v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 444, 224 P.2d 278 (1950) ; People v.
Marks, 146 App. Div. 11, 130 N.Y. Supp. 524 (1st Dep't 1911). Admission
of evidence showing the defendant's lack of 9nens rea comports with the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which expressly allows such
evidence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
The comments to Tentative Draft Number 4, at 253, indicate that this
provision of the code is based on the fact that after a girl passes the age
of ten she begins to obtain a maturity which justifies the belief that she is
over the critical age.
7 Golden v. Commonwealth, 289 Ky. 379, 385, 158 S.W.2d 967, 969 (1942).
California itself utilized similar reasoning in People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132,
46 Pac. 915 (1896), in which the court said: "The protection of society, of
the family, and of the infant, demand that one who has carnal intercourse
under such circumstances shall do so in peril of the fact, and he will not
be heard against the evidence to urge his belief that the victim of his
outrage has passed the period which would make his act a crime."
8 See KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
347 (1948). In recent years extensive surveys of sexual behavior patterns
have indicated that nearly 50% of the males between adolescence and the
age of fifteen in low socio-economic groups, and over 10% of the males in
middle and higher socio-economic groups experience heterosexual relations.
These relations are generally with school companions, thus indicating that
the above figures could be applied, though to a lesser degree, to females of
the same age and socio-economic groups. Mr. Justice Peek concludes, with
some justification, that a girl who belongs to a group whose members in-
dulge in sexual intercourse at an early age is likely to acquire an insight
into the rewards and penalties of sexual indulgence. 393 P.2d at 674. The
statutory presumption that all females under the age of consent do not
have the capacity to comprehend the consequences of such acts is hardly
realistic. The fact that so few charges of statutory rape are brought causes
the author of this comment to doubt the preventive value of statutory rape
sanctions to these groups.
9 Brief for Appellant, pp. 10-11.
10 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
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and intent." They showed that the California Code does not ex-
pressly exclude intent as a requirement of rape,'1 2 and its exclusion
cannot be reasonably implied. In addition, the section of the Code
governing capacity to commit a crime excludes therefrom one who
11 CAL. PENAL CODE § 20. "In every crime or public offense there must exist
a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 261. "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished
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commits the act under ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves
any criminal intent.13 Therefore, they argued, if the defendant had
a bona fide and reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was over the
age of consent, the intent required for commission of the crime was
lacking.
The Hernandez decision is an extension of a marked trend in
California away from the imposition of criminal sanctions in the
absence of culpability. The supreme court had previously held that
a good faith belief of a prior divorce is a defense to a bigamy
charge,14 non-negligent ignorance of faulty labeling is a defense to
a charge under the California Health and Safety Code,'1 5 and lack
of negligence is a defense to charges under the crimes against chil-
dren statutes.16 The first two of these cases had an element in com-
mon with Hernandez: the defendant was either ignorant of or rea-
sonably mistaken as to the facts. The California court has ruled that
"intent" is necessary for the commission of these crimes and that
knowledge of the facts, or an unreasonable lack of knowledge, is an
essential element of that intent.
A disturbing factor in Hernandez is the court's failure to men-
tion the distinction which has often been made between such crimes
as bigamy and faulty labeling on the one hand, and statutory rape
on the other.17 In the latter case, even if the facts were as the de-
fendant believed them to be, he would still be committing fornica-
tion, an immoral and, in many states, illegal act.' 8 In the bigamy
and labeling cases, if the defendant's belief were true, he would
be free of moral as well as legal guilt.
Failure to recognize the distinction renders the ultimate mean-
ing of Hernandez unclear. The court indicated that "it cannot be
a greater wrong to entertain a bona fide but erroneous belief that
a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse has been obtained"1 9
than to remarry in good faith reliance on an invalid divorce. One
can hardly believe that the court sees no difference between mar-
ital and extramarital intercourse, and must therefore conclude that
this issue was overlooked entirely. It is not possible to determine
whether the decision extends to acts which are illegal if the facts
13 CAL. PENAL CODE § 26. "All persons are capable of committing crimes except
those belonging to the following classes: . . .
"Four - Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged
under an ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent."
14 People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
15 People v. Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956).
16 People v. Roderiguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863.
'7 See, e.g., State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 (1859); State v. Audette, 81 Vt. 400,
70 Atl. 833 (1908) ; Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 138 (1875).
18 Fornication is not a crime in California. In re Lane, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33, 367
P.2d 673 (1962) ; People v. Hopwood, 130 Cal. App. 168, 19 P.2d 824 (1933).
19 393 P.2d at 677.
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are as the defendant believes them to be, or is confined to those
which may be immoral.
20
Despite the shortcomings of this case, California has made a
significant return to the common law requirement of mens rea in
all crimes by applying the "intent" requirement to statutory rape.
At common law there is no crime without a union of act and in-
tent,21 and many states22 have general statutory provisions similar
to California's 23 which expressly require intent. The so-called "pub-
lic welfare offenses '24 exist as an exception to this general princi-
ple. It has been suggested 25 that the theory behind imposition of
criminal liability for acts classified as "public welfare offenses"
requires that they meet at least two criteria. First, the crime must
have been created primarily for regulatory purposes such as traffic
control or business regulation and not for the purpose of singling
2 0
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 833 (1957), indicates that a conviction upon
mistake of fact can be obtained only where the act as the defendant saw it
would constitute a crime or "involved a high degree of moral delinquency,"
giving statutory rape as an example. Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox Crim. Cas.
138, 141 (1875) states that the act need not be illegal, merely "wrong."
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 375 (2d ed. 1947) reaches
the conclusion that "This branch of our law [strict penal liability] is so
thoroughly disorganized, rests so largely on conjecture and dubious psy-
chology, and effects such gross injustice as to require major reform." It is
questionable, in this sense at least, whether Hernandez is more than a first
groping step in the right direction.
21 People v. Fernow, 286 Ill. 627, 122 N.E. 155, 157 (1919). "At common law
a crime consisted of an unlawful act with evil intent .... .
22 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §40-1-1 (1963). "A crime or misdemeanor consists
in a violation of a public law in the commission of which there shall be an
union or joint operation of act, and intention or criminal negligence." COLO.
REV. STAT. § 40-1-2 (1963). "Intention is manifested by the circumstances
connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and dis-
cretion of the person accused."
23 CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
24 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1933). The term,
"public welfare offenses," is used to denote the group of police offenses and
criminal nuisances punishable irrespective of the actor's state of mind,
which have developed in England and the United States within approxi-
mately the last century.
25 Id. at 72.
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out individual wrongdoers. Second, the possible penalty for a viola-
tion must be relatively light because sentencing an individual to
prison for an act free from moral guilt would be repugnant to the
community sense of justice. The Supreme Court of California has
followed these principles in Henandez. Statutory rape is a crime
created for the purpose of singling out individuals for punishment
by infliction of a serious penalty. It is not, therefore, a "public
welfare offense," and mens rea is required for its commission.
A further ambiguity in Hernandez is found in the determina-
tion of the quantum of culpability necessary to constitute the re-
quisite mens rea. The court says:
There can be no dispute that a criminal intent exists
when the perpetrator proceeds with utter disregard of, or
in the lack of grounds for [sic], a belief that the female
has reached the age of consent. But if he participates in a
mutual act of sexual intercourse, believing his partner
to be beyond the age of consent, with reasonable grounds
for such belief, where is his criminal intent?
26
The Model Penal Code defines four kinds of culpability: pur-
posely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.2 7 It then specifically
provides that the degree of culpability required to establish the of-
fense of statutory rape is recklessness.2 8 On the other hand, the
statement of the Supreme Court of California seems to indicate that
mere negligence is sufficient. While the California Penal Code's re-
quirement that "There must exist a union, or joint operation of act
and intent, or criminal negligence '12 9 can be interpreted as calling
for more than mere tort negligence, and perhaps even something
approaching recklessness 3 the court does not seem to follow this
approach."'
The view of the Model Penal Code is usually regarded as the
common law position,3 2 and is believed by the author of this com-
ment to be the better reasoned view. Hernandez may not have gone
far enough in this respect.
Jon F. Kidneigh
26 393 P.2d at 676.
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
28 Id. § 2.02 (3): "When the culpability sufficient to establish a material
element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established
if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly thereto."
29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 20.
30 Cf. PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW & ITS PROcEssEs 589 (1962).
31 "No responsible person would hesitate to condemn as untenable a claimed
good faith belief in the age of consent of an 'infant' female whose obviously
tender years preclude the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief."
393 P.2d at 677.
32 Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMB. L. J. 31
(1936).
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